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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~I~HAEL PATRICK PAYNE, ) 
by and through his ) 
Guardian ad Litem, ) 
JOHN MICHAEL PAYNE, ) 
JOHN MICHAEL PAYNE and ) 
STEPHAN IE PAYNE, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
GARTH G. MYERS, M.D.; ) 
JOSEPH P. KESLER, M.D.; ) No. 19218 
THE STATE OF UTAH AND ) 
HANDICAPPED CHILDREN'S ) 
SERVICE; and THE DIVISION ) 
OF HEALTH OF THE STATE OF ) 
UTAH, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellants submit the following brief in reply to the 
briefs filed by respondants Joseph T. Kesler and Garth G. Myers. 
This case involves plaintiffs appeal from summary judgment 
entered in favor of said respondants. Appellants submit in their 
reply brief that respondants have shown in their briefs that 
there are in fact genuine issues of material fact which preclude 
-h,, c1ftinnance of the lower court's summary judgment, that 
'"spondants have raised issues that are not properly before this 
court on appeal, and that respondants have otherwise failed to 
•Jequately respond to the points raised in this appeal by 
-1-
dppellants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE 
DEMONSTRATED BY RESPONDANTS BRIEFS. 
Summary judgment is only proper where there are no 
genuine issues of material fact. Rule Sb, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Both respondants claim in their briefs that 
appellants have alleged facts on appeal that are not part of the 
record on appeal. For example, Respondant Myers claims that the 
record does not indicate specifically that Stephanie Payne's 
obstetrician made a charge for the medical expense of removing 
the IUD, and also that the record does not support the statement 
that the IUD was removed for the purpose of allowing Mr. and ~r •. 
Payne to conceive a second child. Although appellants position 
is that said facts are adequately of record by way of the depose-
tion of Dr. Gibbs, including the exhibits made a part of that 
deposition, if those facts are not adequately of record, then 
there are genuine issues of material fact which have not vet bee· 
resolved in this case, precluding summary judgment. 
The amount of the charge for the removal of the IUD, M 
the purpose for removing the IUD are material facts which must 
resolved in order to make a determination as to whether 
appellants incurred damage prior to the effective Jate of 1 .!t~ 1 
'.1111<>t,1ted §63-30-4, ;:is amended. It is ;;ppellants' position 
.,r llr Gibbs' charges to the Payne's for removal of the IUD 
.• r~ charges incurred bv the Payne's as a direct result of their 
rcl1ance on negligent advice given them by Ors. Kesler and Myers, 
'"d that these charges constituted damages to the Paynes which 
"ere incurred prior to the effective date of U.C.A. §63-30-4, as 
If respondants claim that those facts are not clearly 
•ct torch at the present time in the record in the lower court, 
tt is because the evidence has not been presented to a trier of 
race and the factual issues must be determined before any deci-
31,on on a motion for summary judgment can be affirmed. As indi-
cdted above, however, it is the position of appellants that the 
racts relating to those issues are adequately set forth in the 
record and there is no need for further discovery or fact finding 
un ~hose issues. The deposition of Dr. Gibbs, which is a part of 
enc record on appeal, clearly sets forth that the purpose for 
r~moving the IUD was to allow the Paynes to conceive a second 
.~1ld. This purpose is even implied in questions addressed to 
''· G1~hs oy the attorney for appellant Kesler during the deposi-
·1,,, cit l)r. Gibbs. Dr. Gibbs testified as follows: 
Q. [By Mr. Carney] Do you have any 
recollection of any conversations with 
Mrs. Pavne or her husband regarding taking 
the IUD out? 
~. As to why she was getting it out? 
·~. Yes. 
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A. Not specifically, no. 
Q. Well, generally do you recall --
Obviously she wanted to get it out 
because she wanted to get pregnant. Do 
you remember any conversations about her 
decision to try to become pregnant again? 
A. No. 
**** 
Q. Well, she had the IUD out in February 
and she apparently is now using contra-
ceptive foam? 
A. I always recommend they use some 
contraceptive for a month after taking the 
IUD out. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. It seems as though the incidence of 
miscarriage or tubal pregnancy is 
increased in those who become pregnant 
immediately after an IUD. [emphasis 
added] [Gibbs Depo. pp. 20, 21, 22] 
Respondant Kesler's attorney's own question to Dr. Gibbs 
assumes the fact that the IUD was removed so that Mrs. Payne 
could become pregnant. Moreover, it is clear from the answers 
given by Dr. Gibbs that he also was assuming the purpose for the 
removal of the IUD was to allow Mrs. Payne to become pregnant. 
With respect to the question of whether the cost of 
removing the IUD was charged to the Paynes, Exhibit A to Or. 
Gibbs' deposition included his statement for charges to the 
Paynes over several years time. The Paynes were billed in "''" 
lump sum for all of the Ob. /Gyn. care provided by Dr. Gibbs as i 
related to the pregnancy which resulted in the birth of Michd•l 
Payne. That would include removal of the IUD in Febnrnry, 1978. 
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l Dr. Gibbs made regular charges for services relating to the 
; ,,IJ LS tu rt her evidenced by a specific entry in his billing chart 
to the Paynes in 1979 for insertion of the IUD. It is fair and 
reasonable to imply from the exhibits and the facts on record in 
this case that an expense was incurred by the Paynes for removal 
ut the IUD, which otherwise would not have been incurred had the 
negligent advice not been given by the respondents. Appellants 
have already discussed, in appellants' original brief, the 
existence of a legal obligation to pay for the removal of the IUD 
at the time this service was performed, which obligation consti-
:utes damages to them. 
Thus, the facts are either adequately before the court 
or there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary 
judgment. 
POINT I I. 
UTAH'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STATUTE SETS 
FORTH A FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
NOT A STATUTE OF REPOSE. 
Respondent Kesler charges that the four-year period for 
filing a medical malpractice claim set forth in Utah Code 
Annotdted 178-14-4 is not a statute of limitations, but is a 
';lJtutc· of repose, and therefore discounts appellants' argument 
, ,,,,1 rhey obtained a right or claim as of the date that the four-
' car pPriod began to run under §78-14-4. Appellants' position is 
•hdt Utah's Medical Malpractice Act has two limitation periods. 
!he first is a two-year period from the date of discovery of the 
LnJurv. The second is a maximum four-year period from the date 
"r ~ne negligence. 
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In Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), this 
court referred to the four-year period as a limitations period 
at least two occasions. The court stated: 
The next question to be addressed is 
whether the action, which was originally 
filed without serving a notice of intent 
to sue as required by §78-14-8, could be 
refiled after the running of the four-year 
limitations period. 
* * * * 
Since plaintiff did not serve a notice 
of intent to commence action upon defen-
dant within the four-year statute of limi-
tations period, it is arguable that the 
first action was therefore not "commenced" 
within the meaning of §78-12-40 and that 
its savings provision is not applicable. 
[emphasis added] (601 P.2d at 149) 
It is clear from the above-quoted language in Foil, that 
the Utah Supreme Court considers the four-year period to be a 
statute of limitations and not a statute of repose as assumed by 
respondent Kesler. Since the four-year time period is a statute 
of limitations, then pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §63-30-11(11, 
as amended in 1983, plaintiffs' initial position is that the clairr 
arose when that four-year statute of limitations began to run. 
The four-year statute of limitations began to run on the date of 
the negligence, which was clearly prior to the effective date oi 
§63-30-4. Alternatively, plaintiffs take the position that a 
claim arose when the first medical expense or detriment occurrerl 
as a result of the negligent advice, which in this case is the 
time of the removal of the IUD. 
Since plaintiffs had a claim in either case which had 
arisen prior to the effective date of §63-30-4, then to applv th'' 
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,,~rute to this case and preclude personal liability of the indi-
c1dudl physicians, would constitute an improper retroactive appli-
cdt1on of said statute. 
POINT III. 
DAMAGE WAS INCURRED BY APPELLANTS PRIOR TO 
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF U.C.A. §63-30-4, AS 
AMENDED, AND APPELLANTS DID HAVE A CLAIM 
PRIOR TO SAID EFFECTIVE DATE. 
Contrary to the arguments of respondents, plaintiffs did 
incur damages prior to the effective date of §63-30-4. As has 
been previously noted above, the expenses for medical care pro-
vided by Dr. Gibbs to the Paynes for removal of the IUD were 
incurred prior to the effective date of §63-30-4. These expenses 
would not have been incurred had the Paynes not relied on the 
ddvice of Drs. Kesler and Myers that it was genetically safe for 
them to conceive and bear a second child. The expenses are, 
therefore, damages incurred by Paynes giving them a cause of 
action prior to the effective date of §63-30-4. All other sub-
sequent damages relate back to the same negligence and are part of 
the same cause of action. 
POINT IV. 
U.C.A. §63-30-4, AS AMENDED, IS AMBIGUOUS 
AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION BY 
THE COURT. 
Respondents argue in their briefs that §63-30-4 is clear 
Jn its face and unambiguous and therefore there need be no 
i1t~rpretation made of the statute by this court contrary to the 
-7-
plain language of the statute. Appellants, in their initial 
brief in this case, have clearly pointed out that this statute 
ambiguous. Section 63-30-4 is not only itself ambiguous, but i~ 
becomes even more ambiguous when read in conjunction with other 
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act and also when real 
in conjunction with the provisions of Utah's Indemnity Act, which 
was in force at all times relevant to this case. The various sta· 
tutes simply cannot be reconciled. Moreover, this court in 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), in footnotes and 
11, (quoted in appellants' brief), set forth situations in which 
personal liability is still available against a governmental 
employee. If the statutes are so clear and unambiguous as claimec 
by respondents, then there would have been no need for footnotes; 
and 11 in Madsen. In light of the ambiguities contained in the 
statute, appellants suggest that the statute must be given a 
reasonable interpretation. 
Furthermore, appellants note with interest that neither 
of the respondents have made any statement in response to 
appellants' comments regarding the above-referenced footnotes fro~ 
Madsen nor have they responded in any way to the policy arguments 
raised by the appellants with regard to §63-30-4. Appellants c~ 
only conclude that respondents agree that as a matter of polir• 
§63-30-4 cannot be interpreted as they are arguing, and that di'· 
court must give a reasonable interpretation to the statute which 
does not deny these plaintiffs their rightful actions against toe 
doctors for negligence. 
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POINT V. 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT RELYING ON U.C.A. 
§78-14-6 FOR THEIR CLAIMS AGAINST 
DEFENDANTS. 
Defendant Myers raises Utah Code Annotated §78-14-6 as a 
basis for denying any liability. This section requires that any 
guarantee, warranty, contract or assurance of result given by a 
health care provider may only be used as a basis for liability 
against that health care provider if it is in writing. Myers 
argues that since plaintiffs have not brought forth any writing 
guaranteeing that their second child would not be born with any 
genetic defects, that any claim of liability against Myers is 
barred. 
Defendant Myers' argument falls wide of the mark. 
Plaintiffs are not alleging a breach of contract or guarantee 
against the defendant doctors. Rather, plaintiffs are claiming 
that said defendants gave negligent advice. This is a medical 
malpractice action, not a contract action. Therefore, any 
reference to Utah Code Annotated §78-14-6 is irrelevant. It is 
also outside the scope of any of the pleadings or arguments raised 
in this appeal and should not be considered by this court. None 
"f the defendants raised §78-14-6 as an affirmative defense in 
1_f,e1 r answers to plaintiffs' complaint. It was also not raised as 
" IJa:-; 1 s for any of def end ants' mot ions for summary judgment. It, 
therefore, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Park City Utah Corp. v. 
f:is_1g_n __ C:_Cl_._, 586 P.2d 446 (Utah 1978): 
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Where a party neither rdises an issue in 
its pleadings nor presents it to the trial 
court, the issue cannot be considered for 
the first time on appeal. [586 P.2d at 
450.] 
An affirmative defense must be raised by way of answer, motion oc 
demand so as to put the issue before the trial court, and it is 
not to be raised for the first time on appeal. The defense mav 
be waived, or the party may be estopped to assert such defense. 
See Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., 603 P.2ci 
793 (Utah 1979). 
Thus, Meyers cannot raise U.C.A. §78-14-6 as an affim-
ative defense for the first time on appeal. 
POINT VI. 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER UTAH RECOGNIZES A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WRONGFUL LIFE IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT. 
Defendant Myers also raises the issue of whether Utah 
acknowledges a cause of action for wrongful life. This is 
clearly outside the scope of this appeal and cannot be raised ~ 
Myers as a basis for affirming the lower court's decision. The 
lower court's summary judgment was based exclusively on the 
theory that §63-30-4 of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act pre-
cludes personal liability on the part of employees of the StatE. 
The issue of whether Utah would recognize a cause uf 
action for wrongful life is not an issue properly raised on 
appeal. In fact, that very issue was raised by both defentfanC< 
Myers and Kesler in motions for partial summarv judgml!nt filed ,' 
- 1 0-
:~8.1. l>oth of which motions were denied by Judge David Dee. 
J•h«e !Jee' s order was not made a final order, and is therefore 
'"it dppealilble at this time. Moreover, Judge Dee's ruling 
~ga1nst said defendants' motions for partial summary judgment is 
che law of the case at this point, and it is totally improper for 
Myers lo raise this issue as a point for affirmance of the lower 
court's summary judgment. 
Furthermore, the references to Utah Code Annotated 
§§78-11-23 and 24 are also improper because said statute is not 
applicable to this case. Said statute was passed and became 
effective for the first time in 1983, and has no application to 
the facts of this case. Even if the statute is referred to for a 
sLdtement of policy, it relates to claims made where the person 
mdk1ng the claim alleges that a person would not have been born, 
but would have been aborted but for the conduct of the person 
against whom the claim is made. There is nothing on record in 
chis case, and it is not plaintiffs' claim, that an abortion 
would have occurred had they discovered the genetic disease prior 
rJ rhe birth of their second child. Plaintiffs' claim is that 
they would not have conceived a second child had proper coun-
•e l i~g and advice been given them by the defendant doctors. 
'"''' tc>rce, the policy claimed by defendant Myers, is not appli-
1t)l1' in this case. 
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POINLfil· 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §63-30-4 DENIES EQUAL 
PROTECTION BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RATIONAL 
RELATIONSHIP TO A VALID STATE INTEREST. 
Respondents argue that §63-30-4 does not deny plain-
tiffs equal protection because the statute bears a rational 
relationship to a valid state interest. The state interest they 
set forth is the vitality of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Respondents argue that the amendment to §63-30-4 was necessary 
to prevent circumvention of the Governmental Immunity Act 
through the Indemnity Act. Although preservation of the 
Governmental Immunity Act may be a valid state interest, U.C.A. 
§63-30-4 bears no rational relationship to that interest. 
Rather than taking a course to preserve the vitality of the 
Immunity Act, §63-30-4 emasculates basic common law rights of 
these plaintiffs and of all other persons who are subjected to 
negligent medical care by physicians employed by the State. The 
statute brushes with too broad a stroke and therefore does not 
bear a rational relationship to a valid state interest. For 
that reason, equal protection has been denied these plaintiffs 
by this statute and it should be declared unconstitutional. 
Further, retroactive application of the statute denies 
equal protection because it requires a class of persons such as 
plaintiffs to assume a risk of not being able to be adequatelv 
compensated for negligent medical care provided by state-
employed physicians. That retroactive application of a stat 11 te 
can result in a denial of equal protection is shown in ~':1£_~_"_:. 
-1 2-
.. ;at~h __ E_l_e.<:_t_ric Co., Inc., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's summary judgment in favor of defen-
dents Myers and Kesler should be reversed by the Supreme Court 
becduse §63-30-4, as amended, cannot be applied to this case in a 
retroactive manner to deprive plaintiffs of their claims, and 
because §63-30-4, as amended, cannot be interpreted to deny any 
liability whatsoever on the part of physicians who have com-
mitted malpractice just because they happen to be employed by 
the State. 
On the basis of the foregoing, appellants respectfully 
request the court to revt[se the lower court's summary 
Daeed 'hia /(! day 0~1983. 
STRONG lie HAN 
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judgment. 
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